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Abstract
This special issue on rule of law decay addresses a range of issues prompted by 
recent developments in Poland, Hungary and elsewhere: How to conceptualize 
rule of law decay? What are its characteristics? How can it be explained? Can it 
be detected at an early stage? What is the methodology of undermining the rule of 
law? What, if anything, can outsiders, especially the EU, do to counter this decay? 
What lessons can be drawn for demands imposed on candidates by the EU in future 
enlargement rounds?
1  Introduction to this Half‑Planned Special Issue
When this journal was launched, in 2009, Martin Krygier edited a special issue on 
The fall of European Communism: 20 years after. It was not a confident celebration 
of rule of law reforms in Central and Eastern Europe. The authors cautioned that it 
was not possible to generalize about success or failure because too many countries 
and too many variables were involved. Moreover, what is 20 years in the lifespan 
of the rule of law in any country? Yet they believed that a basic level of democracy 
and the rule of law had been achieved and that the break with the past was irrevers-
ible. As Venelin Ganev wrote: ‘It would take a great deal of paranoid imagining to 
conjure up a scenario where ruling parties in the region cancel elections, imprison 
opposition activists on trumped up charges, and suppress the democratic process. 
And that power-holders in the EU’s newest members will suspend their country’s 
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constitution, dismantle the fundaments of democratic governance and unleash large-
scale repressive measures against the citizenry is as remote a possibility as it is in 
the ‘core Western democracies’ where the Rule of Law originated’.1
However, in the summer of 2012 a crisis in Romania was more or less averted, 
while Hungary was dismantling the rule of law with breathtaking speed after 
Fidesz’s electoral victory in 2010.2 And in late 2015, after the victory of the PiS 
party, Poland surprised both domestic audiences and outside observers with a well-
planned and comprehensive attack on the independence of the judiciary and the 
media.3 The year 2009 now seems a long time ago.
On 22 November 2017 we organized a workshop and a public debate to reflect 
on the rule of law decay in Poland in De Balie in Amsterdam.4 We planned a special 
issue of the HJRL with papers by Marta Bucholc, Gabor Halmai, Radek Markowski 
and Wojciech Sadurski. Later, we asked Gábor Attila Tóth to complement the col-
lection by reflecting on constitutional markers of contemporary authoritarianism. 
But as these papers were being reviewed and published online, other, unsolicited 
papers kept coming in which were thematically so closely related that it seemed 
unnatural to keep them out of the issue. So papers by Tom Gerald Daly, Bogdan 
Iancu, Lisa Louwerse and Eva Kassoti, and Oliver Mader were incorporated.
The collection addresses a range of issues prompted by recent developments in 
Poland, Hungary and elsewhere: How to conceptualize rule of law decay? What are 
its characteristics? How can it be explained? Can it be detected at an early stage? 
What is the methodology of undermining the rule of law? What, if anything, can 
outsiders, especially the EU, do to counter this decay? What lessons can be drawn 
for demands imposed on candidates by the EU in future enlargement rounds?
2 A. von Bogdandy and P. Sonnevend (eds.),Constitutional Crisis in the European Constitutional Area, 
2015, V. Perju, The Romanian double executive and the 2012 constitutional crisis, 13 International Jour-
nal of Constitutional Law (1), 2015, 246–278; P. Blokker, Constitution making in Romania: from reitera-
tive crises to constitutional moment, Romanian Journal of Comparative Law, 2013, 187–204; L. Pech 
and K.L. Scheppele, Illiberalism Within: Rule of Law Backsliding in the EU, Cambridge Yearbook of 
European Legal Studies, 2017, 3–47. See also the 2018 special issue of this journal on the Crisis of Con-
stitutional Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe, edited by Jernej Letnar Černič and Matej Avbelj.
3 R. Markowski, Creating Authoritarian Clientelism: Poland After 2015, Hague Journal on the Rule 
of Law, 2019(1); W. Sadurski, How Democracy Dies (in Poland): A Case Study of Anti-Constitutional 
Populist Backsliding, Sydney Law School Research Paper No. 18/01, 2018; W. Sadurski, Poland’s Con-
stitutional Breakdown, 2019 (in press); W. Sadurski, Polish Constitutional Tribunal Under PiS: From an 
Activist Court, to a Paralysed Tribunal, to a Governmental Enabler, Hague Journal on the Rule of Law, 
2019 (1); Commission’s Reasoned Proposal in accordance with Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European 
Union regarding the rule of law in Poland: Proposal for a Council decision on the determination of a 
clear risk of a serious breach by the Republic of Poland of the rule of law, COM(2017)835 final.
4 The workshop and debate were funded by Vfonds, Tilburg University and Access Europe (University 
of Amsterdam and the Free University Amsterdam). The public debate, with Adam Czarnota, Radek 
Markowski and Wojciech Sadurski, can be viewed at https ://debal ie.nl/debal ie-tv/democ racy-in-europ 
e-what-about -polan d/#.
1 The Rule of Law as an Institutionalized Wager: Constitutions, Courts and Transformative Social 
Dynamics in Eastern Europe, 1 Hague Journal on the Rule of Law (2), 2009, 263–283, 270.
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2  Concepts and Markers
Democracy and the rule of law are almost universally regarded as the only legitimate 
form of government, both vis-à-vis citizens and other states. Hence, as Gabor Attila 
Tóth notes, ‘authoritarians are under pressure to pretend to be democrats’. This is 
one of the reasons why there are now so many political and academic concepts to 
refer to authoritarianism masked as constitutional democracy: illiberal democracy, 
abusive constitutionalism, democratic rot, abusive constitutionalism etcetera.
The special issue commences with an introduction by Tom Gerald Daly into the 
landscape of this rapidly expanding ‘conceptual bazaar’.5 He argues that the emerg-
ing field can best be termed democratic decay, which he defines as the incremental 
degradation of the structures and substance of liberal democracy.6 Daly claims that 
democratic decay is a new research field in its own right, just like transitology and 
consolidatology, with a research agenda which comprises such items as the discov-
ery of patterns and stages of democratic decay, of subtle and less subtle methods 
deployed, and of early warning signs that the health of constitutional democracy is 
in danger.
Gabor Tóth, who also discusses the rich vocabulary of the ‘new transitology’, 
pursues this last line of inquiry in his article on Constitutional markers of author-
itarianism,7 thus presenting an answer to the question formulated by Renata Uitz 
a few years ago: Can you tell when an illiberal democracy is in the making?8 He 
shows that there are various visible and less visible markers: a pseudo constitution; 
hegemonic voting practices; claims by the majority party to represent ‘the people’ 
instead of a part of the electorate; an imitation of institutional checks and balances; a 
superior executive with broad and ill-defined powers; and restrictions on fundamen-
tal rights.
3  Methods
Wojciech Sadurski dissects the methods used by PiS to dismantle the independ-
ence of the Constitutional Tribunal, which started the PiS ‘reform’ of the judiciary.9 
There was an obvious reason why PiS started with the Tribunal: it could invalidate 
laws adopted by the new majority (and was thus able to play an important role as a 
5 Democratic Decay: Conceptualising an Emerging Research Field, Hague Journal on the Rule of Law. 
https ://doi.org/10.1007/s4080 3-019-00086 -2.
6 https ://www.democ ratic -decay .org/.
7 Constitutional Markers of Authoritarianism, Hague Journal on the Rule of Law. https ://doi.
org/10.1007/s4080 3-018-0081-6.
8 R. Uitz, Can you tell when an illiberal democracy is in the making? An appeal to comparative con-
stitutional scholarship from Hungary, International Journal of Constitutional Law, Volume 13, Issue 1, 
January 2015, 279–300.
9 Polish Constitutional Tribunal Under PiS: From an Activist Court, to a Paralysed Tribunal, to a Gov-
ernmental Enabler (forthcoming). Hague Journal on the Rule of Law. https ://doi.org/10.1007/s4080 
3-018-0078-1.
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counterbalance) and it could protect fundamental rights. But when turned into an 
instrument of the parliamentary majority, it can also ensure that legislation can be 
introduced without serious questions being asked. The PiS strategy was a combi-
nation of downright illegal acts (for example the government’s refusal to publish 
unwelcome judgments, thereby deniyng them any legal effect) with the quasi-
legal introduction of ordinary laws which de facto changed the Constitution. This 
amounted, as Sadurski has put it elsewhere, to a ‘constitutional coup d’etat’.10 Sad-
urski notes that the Constitutional Tribunal was a relatively easy target because it 
was the only body entrusted with constitutional review. ‘With hindsight, it would 
have been more difficult for them (PiS) to succeed had a legal culture been generated 
under which all judges, low and high, could refuse to apply a statute they deemed 
unconstitutional’. Indeed, no constitution or rule of law arrangement is ‘a machine 
that would go of itself’, as Kammen once put it,11 and any functional constitution 
should at least to some extent be backed up by the legal culture in which it functions. 
The importance of culture is also discussed by Marta Bucholc, though in a different 
way when compared to Sadurski. Where he focuses on how law and institutional 
arrangements might be conducive to a rule of law culture, she shows how PiS has 
subverted this rule of law culture itself, especially by shaping and managing collec-
tive memory and perceptions. In her exploration of the cultural dimension of rule of 
law decay, Bucholc identifies the use of bricolage, retouch and re-stylization tech-
niques. For example, the Polish Constitution of 1997 has in recent years been dis-
credited by framing it as a mutation of communism. The attack on the Constitutional 
Tribunal was thus presented as an instance of restorative justice aimed at abolishing 
the last remnants of communism. Bucholc also described how measures against the 
judiciary have been accompanied by unrelenting media coverage of the failures of 
the court system, including corruption and miscarriages of justice.
4  Causes
Propaganda is also a theme in Radek Markowski’s analysis of the causes of the elec-
toral victory of PiS in 2015 and its subsequent attack on the rule of law. Markowski 
emphasizes that the 2015 PiS victory was not a landslide but an ‘electoral accident’: 
only 18.6% of the eligible, or 37.5% of the active voters supported PiS, which, due 
to election laws, turned out to be just enough for a 51% parliamentary majority. 
Interestingly, there is no evidence of a popular or electoral demand for the radical 
measures that PiS have taken since 2015. Recent events in Poland are rather ‘a clas-
sical supply side nationalistic/authoritarian/conservative revolution’. Yet the revo-
lution is puzzling: PiS was already a well-established (opposition) political party 
when it came to power. Its insiders, representatives and leadership had benefitted 
10 ‘What is Going on in Poland is an Attack against Democracy’, Interview with Wojciech Sadurski by 
Maximilian Steinbeis, 15 July 2017, VerfBlog, 2016/7/15, https ://verfa ssung sblog .de/what-is-going -on-
in-polan d-is-an-attac k-again st-democ racy/. http://dx.doi.org/10.17176 /20160 718-10434 8.
11 M. Kammen, A Machine That Would Go of Itself: The Constitution in American Culture, 1986.
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from access to state resources, public sector jobs, democratic security, and relative 
prestige among part of the population. Why would they choose the radical and even 
hazardous attack on the Constitution and the judiciary? And why would a part of the 
electorate support the recent illiberal turn? Markowski offers a series of tantalizing 
ideas. The most striking one is that democratic decay is not the result of the legacy 
of Polish ‘Homo Sovieticus’, as many have claimed. Rather, a legacy of the subver-
sion of communism through ‘adaptive resourcesfulness’, including support of the 
Catholic Church, have contributed to dispositions unconducive to trust in institu-
tions and constitutional democracy.
5  Remedies
How does one ensure that EU Member States live up to the standard of the rule of 
law and the values listed in Article 2 TEU? Few questions regarding rule of law 
decay have generated as much scholarly analysis and commentary as this one.12
Oliver Mader offers a thorough exploration of the foundations and modus oper-
andi of rule of law enforcement in the EU. One of his arguments is that a rule of law 
culture would be fostered if the CVM (Certification and Verification Mechanism) 
were extended to all Member States. The CVM was introduced in 2007 when Bul-
garia and Romania acceded to the EU. It was meant as a transitional measure—it 
still exists!—to assist both countries in making further progress in judicial reform 
and the fight against corruption and organized crime. According to Mader, the regu-
lar, evidence-based monitoring which the CVM provides could give a more objec-
tive and reliable underpinning to other existing and proposed mechanisms to enforce 
the rule of law.
This is an idea with traction: on March 18, Manfred Weber, the German lead can-
didate of the European People’s Party for the EU Commission presidency, together 
with Udo di Fabio (a former judge at the German Constitutional Court), proposed 
the establishment of a committee of independent experts (former judges, recognized 
figures from the highest national and European courts), ‘that would be tasked with 
regularly reviewing the state of play of the independence of the judiciary and free-
dom of the press; they would also investigate potential political, judicial and admin-
istrative corruption—in every member state of the European Union.’13 And one day 
later, the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs (Didier Reynders) and his German 
colleague for European Affairs (Michael Roth) proposed a new mechanism for rule 
of law surveillance. This would ‘allow for a constructive, structured and interactive 
political discussion between all member states’, a peer review based on ‘objectivity, 
12 See especially the debates on Verfassungsblog and C. Closa and D. Kochenov (eds.), Reinforcing the 
Rule of Law Oversight in the European Union, 2016; A. Jakab and D. Kochenov (eds.), The Enforcement 
of EU Law and Values: Ensuring Member State Compliance, 2017.
13 https ://euobs erver .com/opini on/14442 9.
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non-discrimination, equal treatment of all member states, following an evidence-
based and nonpartisan approach.’14
Gábor Halmai explores another avenue, which has been widely discussed by poli-
ticians and policy-makers over the past few years: financial conditionality and finan-
cial penalties. ‘This’, former Commissioner Viviane Reding has said, ‘would be the 
most effective way to influence the behavior of a government like the Polish one—
making a link with the money. It is the only thing they understand’. Halmai does 
not focus on the 2018 Commission proposal for a regulation to protect the Union’s 
budget in the case of generalised deficiencies as regards the rule of law in the Mem-
ber States,15 but on the Common Provision Regulation which regulates the European 
Structural and Investment Funds. According to Halmai, this Common Provision 
Regulation requires Member States to uphold the rule of law. It can be used to sus-
pend funds. And it does not require the hurdles of a 4/5 majority or the unanimity of 
Article 7 TEU. Halmai is aware that such measures are controversial, because ordi-
nary citizens, not their authoritarian governments, would suffer most. Nonetheless, 
the dependence of the governments of Poland and Hungary on the aforementioned 
funds is significant, and as such suspending funds may also embolden the political 
opposition. This idea  seems to be convincing to many. On January 17, 2019, the 
members of the European Parliament voted, with a 397-158 majority, in favour of 
draft rules to suspend EU budget payments to the countries jeopardising the rule 
of law in their countries. More specifically, under the proposed rules, which were 
first tabled by the EU Commission in its long-term EU budget plans, governments 
interfering with courts or failing to tackle corruption will especially risk the afore-
mentioned suspension. To be sure, these rules will still have to be negotiated with 
the member states. In any event, on the same day, the European Parliament tripled 
the proposed EU budget—from 642 to 1834 billion Euro—for promoting democ-
racy, the rule of law and fundamental rights. Funding civil society organizations is 
an important part of this promotion plan that was approved with a 426-152 majority.
Less well studied is the role of the Council of Europe, especially the so-
called Venice Commission (officially: the European Commission for Democracy 
through Law). This Commission is the subject of the article by Bogdan Iancu. 
The Venice Commission is an expert body of the Council of Europe, consisting 
of representatives, especially senior academics, supreme or constitutional court 
judges or members of national parliaments, of the 47 member states of the Coun-
cil of Europe, and of 13 other states. Its primary task is to assist and advise indi-
vidual countries in constitutional matters, in order to improve the functioning of 
democratic institutions and the protection of human rights. Iancu describes the 
increasingly important role of the Commission in in cases of rule of law decay. 
He praises its contribution to providing guidelines and information to post-com-
munist democracies. But his article has a strong critical focus, dealing with its 
14 https ://euobs erver .com/polit ical/14444 3.
15 Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on 
the protection of the Union’s budget in case of generalised deficiencies as regards the rule of law in the 
Member States, COM(2018) 324 final.
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methodological and procedural deficiencies, leading for example to inconsisten-
cies across country opinions. Iancu particularly mentions the ‘arguments from 
authority’ (referring to itself as the ultimate source of wisdom) sometimes used 
by the Venice Commission, these ‘being a last line of defense in common logic 
and constitutional theory alike.’ All of these deficiencies carry the peril of sub-
ordinating constitutionalism to instrumental considerations, which, although dif-
ferent in their degree and purpose, are not too different in kind from the con-
stitutional instrumentalism of populists in Hungary, Poland or Romania. This 
might well result in an erosion of the Venice Commission’s credibility, which is 
a missed opportunity in times when we are in urgent need of stable constitutional 
limits and distinctions.
6  Future Enlargement Conditionality
It is not at all self-evident that the EU’s accession policies are responsible for recent 
rule of law decay in Hungary and Poland. For one thing, the rule of law appeared to 
be fairly robust in Hungary before 2010, and in Poland before 2015. As Markowski 
points out, there was no demand for the attack on the judiciary which PiS carried out 
after the elections (but the fact that the Hungarian and Polish parliamentary majori-
ties went to great lengths to dismantle the judiciary is of course proofthat the judici-
ary was a serious check on the exercise of their powers). Moreover, the post 2015 
reforms are as much the result of domestic processes as they are the result of acces-
sion conditionality. Indeed, not all countries in Central and Eastern Europe which 
acceded in 2004 are witnessing rule of law decay today, at least not to a degree com-
parable to Poland and Hungary, and this variation is hard to explain if accession 
policies are an all-determining factor.
Even so, the EU and some scholars have for a long time credited accession con-
ditionality as an important and effective incentive for political transformations. So 
even if this accession policies are not an all-determining explanatory factor for rule 
of law decay, recent events in Poland and Hungary may call for a re-examination of 
the methodology of EU accession policies. The question, in particular, is whether 
the Commission’s operationalization of the Copenhagen political criteria has taken 
sufficient account of the fact that the rule of law not only depends on rules, proce-
dures and institutions, but also on a shared understanding among the main politi-
cal actors that these rules deserve to be respected, even if it is relatively easy for a 
majority party to ignore, violate or subvert them in the interest of unrestrained gov-
ernment by ‘the people’. Lisa Louwerse and Eva Kassoti offer a thorough analysis of 
the development of rule of law accession conditionality since 2004. They argue that 
the Commission’s accession policies focus too heavily on the acquis and less on the 
introduction of formal characteristics of the rule of law. They also note an increased 
sensitivity of the Commission to the underlying societal and cultural transformation 
that a robust rule of law requires. They conclude, however, that this commitment 
to the cultural dimension of the rule of law is mostly lip service; it has not yet been 
incorporated in the accession methodology.
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7  Some Concluding Observations
In 1997, Fareed Zakaria called attention to the term ‘illiberal democracy’, in an arti-
cle in Foreign Affairs.16 He developed his article into a book, published in 2004, for a 
broader audience, with the telling title: The Future of Freedom.17 Zakaria noted that in 
a growing number of countries, democracy—understood as majority rule—was flour-
ishing, while freedom was withering; elections seemed to pave the way for dictator-
ships that curtailed people’s liberty. There were thus not an insubstantial number of 
elected or re-elected regimes (amongst many others he mentioned Russia, Venezuela, 
the Palestinian Authority) that routinely violated the constitutional boundaries of their 
authority and robbed citizens of their basic rights. Zakaria was not particularly thinking 
about Europe. On the contrary, he wrote that after 1989 Poland, Hungary and Czecho-
slovakia ‘moved rapidly to establish liberal democracy, which has taken remarkably 
firm root.’ In ‘little more than a decade after the collapse of communism, Europe is 
coming tantalizingly close to becoming, in the elder George Bush’s phrase, “whole and 
free”’.18
Europe, so much was clear, was not perceived as being in ‘freedoms danger zone’. 
We now know that this evaluation was a tad too optimistic. Nevertheless, in the final 
pages of his book and his article, Zakaria signalled a clear warning: the enormous soci-
etal and economic changes the world was facing, might well result in an ‘unfettered and 
dysfunctional democracy (…) that will discredit democracy itself (…)’.19 We now also 
know that there was more than a measure of truth in this prediction. Indeed, democracy 
that is not being backed up or counterbalanced by the rule of law is an ‘empty shell’: 
not just ‘inadequate but potentially dangerous, bringing with it the erosion of liberty, 
the manipulation of freedom, and the decay of a common life.’20
In the EU a series of mechanisms and procedures—(pre)-Article 7 TEU, infringe-
ment procedures before the Court of Justice, the Justice Scoreboard—are currently 
being deployed to try to counter the rule of law decay in EU Member States. Many 
more mechanisms and procedures are being proposed and discussed. Yet a thorough 
analysis of the inner stuffings of democracy that cause rule of law decay is at least just 
as important. That is to say, again in Zakaria’s words, the problems of governance in 
the twenty-first century are problems within democracy. ‘This makes them more dif-
ficult to handle, wrapped as they are in the mantle of legitimacy’. We hope that this 
Special Issue offers useful perspectives on the challenges that accompany this deceitful 
ambiguity.
Publisher’s Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published 
maps and institutional affiliations.
16 The Rise of Illiberal Democracy, Foreign Affairs 67/6 1997, 22–43.
17 The Future of Freedom. Liberal Democracy at Home and Abroad New York, Norton and Company, 
2004.
18 Ibid., 68.
19 Ibid., 255.
20 Ibid., 256.
